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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its
ROAD COMMISSION,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
CHARLES W. TAGGART, Trustee, a
partnership, Salt Lake County, a body
politic, First Security Bank of Utah,
a Utah corporation, and Zions First
National Bank, a Utah corporation,

Case No.
10594

Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT PARTNERSHIP'S
PETITION FOR REHEARING
Pursuant to Rule 76(e) U. R. C. P., the Appellant Partnership herewith petitions this Cour:t for a rehearing of the
law issue underlying Point II of this Appeal. The Appellant
urges that based upon the grounds set out in this Petition,
seen in view of the facts of record and the accompanying
Brief, the Court should reconsider its Opinion of July 10,
1967, as to the second assignment of error, by ordering a
rehearing of the same.
This Petition is grounded upon the basis that with respect to said Point II, the Opinion of the Court is, as a
matter of law, mistaken in its conclusions that:
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(1)

"The defendant made no offer of proof so we
are unable to determine from the record before
us what other matters counsel wished to pursue
on that subject."

(2)

"Without a showing or an offer to prove similarity of the Condas property with the subject property, we are unable to say that the ruling of the
Court was arbitrary and unreasonable."

As to ground ( 1) , the record of trial evidences beyond
reasonable contest that the import of the cross-examination
(prohibited and stricken by the trial court) was clear from
the very question, itself, thus eliminating the necessity for
a formal offer of proof. As to ground (2), the record of
trial will further evidence that a foundation and showing
of similarity of the Condas property to the condemned
property under consideration, was adequately made.
Thus the Court can and should determine that the trial
court ruling, which stopped the cross-examination on this
key point, was "arbitrary and unreasonable" so as to substantially prejudice the Appellant and deny to it a full
hearing in the matter. A new trial on the issues of Just
Compensation should be ordered upon rehearing, the Appellant respectfully submits.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR.
520 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Appellant
Partnership
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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its
ROAD COMMISSION,
Plain ti/ f and Respondent,
vs.
CHARLES W. TAGGART, Trustee, a
partnership, Salt Lake County, a body
politic, First Security Bank of Utah,
a Utah corporation, and Zions First
National Bank, a Utah corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No.
10594

BRIEF IN SUPPORT
OF
PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF LEGAL POSITION
It is not the aim of this petition to simply restate and

urge again issues which have been submitted to and resolved by the Court in the appeal. Such is not the foundation of the rehearing procedure and it will not be countenanced as a basis for a Petition. Salt Lake City v. Tellurwe
Power Company, 82 Utah 622, 26 P. 2d 822 (1933); Panagopulos v. Manning, 93 Utah 215, 72 P. 2d 456 (1937).
Rather, it is urged in this Petition that the Opinion of the
Court of July 10, 1967, has overlooked or misinterpreted
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material facts of record and has reached erroneous conclusions of law relating to Appellant's second assignment of
error, and upon which the judgment of the trial court is
substantially upheld. The correction of those facts and
conclusions on rehearing should result in a reversal of the
trial court and the entry of an order of new trial on Just
Compensation in the case. A petition for rehearing is properly made out on these grounds. Cummings v. Nielson, 42
Utah 157, 129 Pac. 619 (1913); Venard v. Old Hickory
Mining Co., 4 Utah 67, 6 Pac. 415 (1885).
ARGUMENT
THE OPINION OF THE COURT ERRONEOUSL Y C 0 N S 'T R U E S AND MISINTERPRETS
FACTS AND LAW IN POINT II OF THE
APPEAL.
The full-fledge of facts involved in the Defendant's
seoond assignment of error will not be recounted here, they
having been set out at pages 21-22, 39-41 and 46-49 of Defendant's appeal Brief. In order that the gravity of the
assignment be completely weighed, the court's attention is
invited to a review of those pages of Defendant's Brief, as
well as to the authorities cited and discussion given to the
assignment of error, generally, at pages 39-49 of the Brief.
Suffice to say that Point II of the appeal stems from
the refusal of the trial court to permit the Defendant to
cross-examine the last expert witness for the State, A. B. C.
Johns, with respect to his prior but recent appraisal of the
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Condas land abutting the condemned property. Johns had
testified on direct-examination for the State, that the fair
market value of the north section of the subject property
condemned was $4,000.00 per acre (Tr. 800). Defendant's
counsel, on cross-examination, asked the witness if he had
not previously appraised the Condas property next door
for $10,000.00 per acre, that appraisal having been made
for the landowner (Tr. 843). The objedion of the State
on the grounds of immateriality was sustained, the trial
court remarking to the jury that while cross-examination
of factors in nearby areas was normally proper, it was outweighed in this instance by the risks of introducing other
issues which time did not permit (Tr. 842-844).
The Opinion of this Court, in holding that prejudicial
error was not committed by this limitation of cross-examination, states that:
"The defen.:lant made no offer of proof so we
are unable to determine from the record before us
what other matters counsel wished to pursue on that
subject. Without a showing or an offer to prove
similarity of the Condas property with the subject
property, we are unable to say that the ruling of the
court was arbitrary and unreasonable." (Emphasis
added.)
Such holding is unfounded in law and unsupported by
the facts of record and should be correctej by rehearing,
the reasons being:

1. The question underlying the assignment of
error was leading, specific, pointed and by its na-
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ture, required no "offer of proof as to what other
matters counsel wished to pursue".
The key question, "that you appraised the Condas Piece
for the landowner for $10,000.00 an acre", was not one of
general inquiry. It did not pose an open question, such as
[for what amount did you appraise the Condas property
next door]. Had that been the nature of the question, Defendant's counsel would have been obligated, as the Court's
Opinion suggests, to make an offer of proof as to what was
intended to be shown.
BUT THE QUESTION HEREIN WAS NOT OF
THAT TYPE. Its nature was pointed, specific, leading and
clear as to its effect. It seared the credibility of Mr. Johns'
opinion as perhaps no other question could have properly
done on cross-examination in the case. There can be no
doubt in the minds of reasonable men as to what was to be
shown by the question or what its effect was to be. And the
trial court was not misled or unadvised that the question
went to the heart of the bias, credibility and integrity of the
witness (a witness whose answers to that point had been
mostly clipped and indifferent). The question, ipso facto
and in the light of earlier testimony both on direct and
cross, unequivocally offered to prove that this witness, who
had appraised the subject property at $4,000.00 per acre
for the State Road Commission, had previously appraised
abutting property (separated only by a fence) at $10,000.00
an acre for the landowner, Condas.
Under such circumstances, the prevaiilng rule is that
an offer of proof to apprise the court of the matter to be
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pursued, is unnecessary. Koppang v. Se'uier, 106 Mont. 79,
75 P. 2d 790 (1938); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Doerksen,
75 F. 2d 96 (loth Cir. 1935); Fahey v. Clark, 125 Conn. 44,
3 A. 2d 313 (1938). The Idaho Supreme Court, in McKie
v. Chase, 73 Ida. 491, 253 P. 2d 787, 793 (1953) put it this
way:
"In each instance, where the evidence offered
by the plaintiffs was rejected by the court, the plaintiffs made formal offers of proof. However, such
offers, under the circumstances, appear to be unnecessary because the questions to which the objections were made were sufficient to indicate the pertinency, materiality and nature of the testimony
sought."
In 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal and Error Sec. 604 at p. 70
( 1962) the principle is affirmed :
"The general rule that the trial court cannot be
put in error in excluding evidence unless an offer of
proof is made showing what the evidence or testimony would have been if received, has been applied
to preclude review of alleged error in excluding evidence. However, the making of an offer of proof is
not a condition of the right to a review of a ruling
excluding evidence unless the nature of the evidenc~
intended to be elicited by the challenged question
is not apparent."
2. A sufficient foundation and showing was
made to prove similarity of the Condas property
with the subject property.

The Opinion of the Court further states herein that
the Defendant made no offer to prove similarity of the
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Condas ground with the condemned property. The court's
attention is invited to the following portions of the record
of trial regarding the Condas property, all of which proceded the focal question :
Beginning at Tr. page 827, line 14
(By Def's counsel on cross-examination)
Q. Mr. Johns, tell us, you have appraised properties in this area before, have you not?

A.

Yes, sir, I have.

Q. And you have, as a matter of fact, appraised a piece of property over here in the corner
for a Mr. Condas whose property was also condemned by the Sttae Road Commission?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q. But that was in connection with the Twenty-first South Expressway, isn't that right?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q. And that property wound up in a condemnation suit, isn't that right?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q. And you were called as a witness to testify
in connection with your opinion as to the market
value of the Condas piece, isn't that correct?

A.

Yes.

Q. Part of that Condas piece lay in a zone
that was the same zoning as the north part of the
subject property M-1, isn't that correct?
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A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Lay in the County?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q. And it had access to Redwood Road and it
also had access to 2100 South Street?

A.

Yes, sir.

And at Tr. 841, line 3.
(Examination by Def's counsel)
Q. And you have acquainted yourself, have
you not, with the sales in the industrial area just
across the street from the subject property?

A.

Yes.

Q.

U. S. Steel property for one?

A.

Yes.

Q. We will talk about that one in a minute but
in any event you have acquainted yourself over the
last couple of years with other sales in the industrial
center, in the interior of the industrial center as well
as those on Redwood Road, isn't that correct?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q. And as a matter of fact, you took some of
those sales into consideration in appraising this
piece of property for the Condas's, did you not?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q. In fact, you went up into - you appraised
this for the Condas's. You went to the 1700 South
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area to the sale of the Kameral areas for $17,000 an
acre or something?
A.

As I recall.

* * *
Tr. 842, line 3
Q. You took into consideration the Williamson sale up on Redwood Road and the Overmeyer
sale?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q. And you went clear up to Ninth South in
appraising the Condas tract?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q. And the Condas tract abutted upon the
Gedge tract, didn't it, immediately south?

A.

I don't recall. It probably did.

Q. The Gejge tract, before part of it was
taken for the expressway, it abutted immediately
on the Condas land?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Same zoning, wasn't it?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q. And that Condas piece was immediately
east of the M-2 property, isn't that correct, in the
subject property?

A. I don't think it extended touch? I don't recall.

did it actually
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Q.

It was in the same proximity?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Had the same proximity on the Pole Line

A.

Yes.

Road?

Q. You testified in that condemnation case on
behalf of the land owner, didn't you?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q. You recall the market value of $10,000 -

you testified the fair

MR. NOVAK: Objection, your Honor.
MR. CAMPBELL: I have the right, I think,
to state my question - that you appraised that
Condas piece for the landowner for $10,000 an acre?
MR. NOVAK: I object, your Honor, on the
ground that it is immaterial and I move the remarks
of counsel be stricken. That is not material to any
issue in this case as to what he might have appraised
another piece of property for.
All of the testimony referred to above was received
as a part of the evidence in the trial devoted exclusively to
unimproved property, industrial in this instance, and under
conditions where the trial court had admitted as comparable
sales, property more than ten city blocks distant from the
subject land. (See Johns' testimony on direct, Tr. 775, 782,
788).
Thus the record of trial shows without reasonable dispute, that with respect to the Condas property, it was next
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door to the subject land, it had the same use and zoning a::;
the subject property, it possessed the same access to 2100
South Street and Redwood Road as did Taggart, the Johns'
appraisal of the Condas property mas made at a time within
reasonable proximity to the value date of the subject property, and that the witness had appraised both Condas and
the subject under the same standard, fair market value and
had utilized the same comparable sales. What essential element needs to be added to prove reasonable similarity between the two properties? None, it is submitted. Certainly,
under the test announced by this Court in State of Utah v.
Peek, 1 U. 2d 263, 265 P. 2d 630 (1953), Southern Pacific
Company v. Arthur, 10 U. 2d 306, 352 P. 2d 693 (1960),
Weber Basin Water Conserv. Dist. v. Ward, 10 U. 2d 29,
347 P. 2d 862 (1959), State Road Comm. v. Woolley, 15 U.
2d 248, 390 P. 2d 860 (1964), and the leading case, State
Road Comm. v. Peterson, 12 U. 2d 317, 366 P. 2d 76 (1961),
the foundational requirements of comparability were met
in the Condas evidence. Undoubtedly, they could have been
more elaborate, but as made, they were reasonably sufficient and adequate to advise the trial court and this Court
of the nature and factors surrounding the comparable property.
True enough, the issue of similarity or comparability
is one initially for the trial judge as a preliminary question of law. State Road Commission v. Peterson, supra.
If the property appears to the court to be within the area
of reasonable oomparison to the condemned tract, the testimony is to be received. The weight to be accorded it is a
jUJ:'Y matter. State of Utah v. Peek, supra. But the trial
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court herein was not at all worried about the comparability
test. Indeed, the court's remarks, upon sustaining the
State's objection, necessarily implied that Condas was similar to the subject ground (Tr. 843-844). Nor was there
any objection ever made by the State to the question posed,
on the basis of lack of foundation.
It is respectfully and earnestly submitted that contrary

to the opinion of July 10, a review of the record will reveal

that an adequate foundation was made to show reasonable
similarity of the Condas property, thus enabling this Court
to say that the exclusionary ruling was arbitrary, unreasonable, and prejudicial to the Defendant.

The ruling of the trial court was prejudicial to
the Defendant's guaranty to a full and fair trial.

3.

Although the opinion of the court does not pass directly on the issue, the implication from the language is
that the exclusionary ruling of the lower court was error,
but that because of the claimed lack of foundation and an
offer or proof, the issue of whether the ruling was prejudicial could not be determined. The law of the case1 leaves
little to doubt that the .stopping of cross-examination herein
was error. Bingaman v. City of Seattle, 139 Wash. 68, 245
Pac. 411 (1926); Contra Costa County v. East Bay Munic.
Dist., 1 Cal. Rptr. 60 (1960); Basch v. Iowa Power and
Light, 95 N. W. 2d 714 (Iowa 1959); People v. Murata, 326
P. 2d 94 7 (Cal. 1958). For this case, as well as for precedent value, it is respectfully submitted that on rehearing,
the Court should state that the trial court ruling did consti-
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tute error and then address itself to the issue of whether
the error was prejudicial.
The error was prejudicial. It deprived the Defendant
of the full sweep of cross-examination of the key expert for
the Government. Nothing is gainsaid by the observation
that a land evaluation expert, experienced as he is in the
art of rendering testimony, is the most difficult type of
witness to effectively dispute on cross-examination. Every
measure within reason should be extended to counsel in his
attempt to place such a witness in the rightful setting. 1 But
more than that, the ruling of the trial court herein took
away from the Defendant its chief attack upon the credibility and bias of Mr. Johns, an attack which, as evidenced
by the record, constituted a substantial portion of the crossexamination. The foundational questions regarding the
Condas tract as quoted-above, were pursued by Defendant
without State objection, and were all keyed to the very
question which the trial court refused to allow. Not only
was the Defendant prohibited by the ruling from exploring the reason, if any, why Johns had made inconsistent
appraisals for different clients (one a condemnor and another a condemnee) on the same class of ground, but Defendant was as well prohibited in closing argument from
1 In ordering a new trial, this court said in State of Utah
U. 2d 263, 265 P. 2d 630 (1953):

v. Peek, 1

"There is no other instrument so well adapted to discovery of the truth as cross-examination, and as long as it
tends to disclose the truth, it should never be curtailed or
limited. Any inquiry should be allowed which an individual
about to buy would feel it in his interests to make."
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drawing to the jury's attention, the obvious bias and discredit which the question reasonably portrayed.
And it is the very testimony of Mr. Johns on the value
before the acquisition, upon which the legal validity of the
jury interrogatories depends. The interrogatory of the
jury as to the value of the total property before condemnation was $106,709.00 below that value estimate of all other
witnesses. Only Mr. Johns' estimate was lower than the
jury interrogatory, by some $334,000.00. But for Johns'
appraisal of the subject property before condemnation, the
verdict is without the range of the testimony, and as a
matter of law, would be set aside or subject to additur
procedure. Weber Basin Conservancy District v. Moore, 2
U. 2d 254, 272 P. 2d 176 (1954).
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CONCLUSION
A rehearing should be ordered to review the second
assignment of error and treatment given to it by the Opinion of July 10. Respectfully, it is submitted that said Opinion should be found erroneous in that regard, that it be
held that an offer of proof was unnecessary as to the nature of the Con,ias inquiry, and that there was a sufficient
showing of similarity of the Condas ground with the subject
property.
Upon rehearing, the Court should determine and state
that the cross-examination ruling was clear error and that
it was prejudicial to the Defendant's rights to a full and
fair hearing. A new trial on Just Compensation should be
thereupon ordered, it is respectfully submitted.
Respectfully,
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR.
520 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Appellant
Partnership
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